Ethnic Identity, Institution, and Secession in Indonesia; Continuity and Change in The Achenes Rebellions by Arfiansyah, A
  
ETHNIC IDENTITY, INSTITUTION, AND SECESSION IN 
INDONESIA: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE  
ACEHNESE REBELLIONS 
 
_________ _________  
 
Arfiansyah  
Fakultas Ushuluddin IAIN Ar-Raniry Banda Aceh 
 
ABSTRAK 
Tulisan ini berusaha menjelaskan kemunculan dua phenomena yang 
berbeda dalam pergerakan kemerdekaan Aceh, Indonesia:     1) 
kemunculan gerakan pemberontakan Darul Islam pada tahun 1950an, 
dan 2) perkembangan Gerakan Aceh kemerdekan (GAM) pada tahun 
1980an hingga 1990an. Penulis berpandangan bahwa kekuatan utama 
yang menyebabkan dua perbedaan dalam periode pemberontakan  
yang berbeda tersebut adalah interaksi institusional yang mendesign 
ide Negara bangsa dan peluang untuk untuk memobilisisi budaya 
yang didapat oleh institusi yang lainnya. Dengan kata lain, gerakan-
gerakan kemerdekaan di Aceh dibentuk dan di mediasi oleh institusi-
institusi yang memanifes-tasikan diri sebagai insititusi politik dan 
memiliki dampak yang besar terhadap perkembangan sebuah 
identitas etnik. Identitias tersebut dimobilisasi dan sekaligus untuk 
klaim sebuah grup (Horowitz, 1985: 229-235). Para elit etnik, sebagai 
pimpinan dalam sebuah gerakan, bertindak sebagai agen untuk 
memperkuat mobilisasi politik dan mendefinisikan keinginan sebuah 
daerah yang menjadi daerah basis budaya mereka. Isu yang terdapat 
dalam identitas etnik dan tantangan-tantangan institusi  merupa-kan 
permasalahan yang juga akan dibahas dalam tulisan ini. Khususnya, 
tentang apakah persamaan yang alami pada pondasi ideology  yang 
diwariskan dari satu ke gerakan pemberontakan lainnya pada 
periode yang berbeda? Kenapa, contohnya, pem-berontakan pertama 
yang terjadi pada tahun 1950an berhubungan dengan gerakan Darul 
Islam lainnya di Republik ini?Lalu kenapa GAM pada tahun 1980an 
mengunakan dasar dasar etnik untuk pemberontakan politik mereka? 
Demikian juga, kenapa kedua gerakan pemberontakan tersebut 
muncul dengan  varian yang berbeda. Misalnya, Darul Islam 
dipimpin oleh para Ulama sedangkan GAM dipimpin oleh kelompok 
Sekuler. Jawaban-jawaban untuk pertanyaan tersebut akan digali 
melalui sejarah insititusi kedua gerakan perberontakan tersebut. 
Keywords: Aceh, Secessionist, Darul Islam, GAM, Institution    
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A. Introduction 
Students of nationalism have developed and refined 
approaches to the study of ethnic secessionism in the context of 
global ethnic conflicts.1 However, most theoretical discussions 
have been with reference to Africa, Eastern Europe, North 
America and Central Asia. It is interesting to note that although 
many secessionist movements have emerged in Southeast Asia, 
literature on ethnic secessionism tends to be almost anti-theore-
tical. This phenomenon is evident in Horowitz’s encyclo-pedic 
study on ethnic conflict.  Horowitz only briefly mentions ethnic 
secessionist movements in this area (Horowitz, 1985:213-238). Area 
specialists focusing on Aceh secessionist movements illustrate the 
other trend in this sphere. Literature on this particular topic is in 
many ways impressive, but for any one seeking explanations of 
the root causes and possible common patterns underlying this 
ethnic secessionist phenomenon a number of different conclusions 
are offered (Morris, 1984; Sjamsuddin, 1985; van Dijk, 1987; Kell, 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Wood, Secession: A Comparative Analytical 
Framework, in Canadian Journal of Political Science, 14, no. , 1 (March, 1981).  There 
are at least four perspectives which have been employed in the study of seces-
sion: (1) strong state theory that argues that common cultural basis for plural 
societies requires a strong state or regime to uphold national integration; (2) 
“internal colonialism” that argues that ethnic nationalism has its roots in the 
uneven regional economic development between the centers and the peripheries 
of multi-ethnic societies. Such a relationship may in turn be the result of policies 
of “internal colonialism”. Perceptions of relative deprivation may develop, and 
they generate demands for a “better bargain”. If the demands are ignored, 
societies on the peripheries will call for secession legitimated by reference to 
ethnic differences; (3) Territorial history stress that ethnic groups define 
themselves by reference to their history in a particular homeland territory. 
Should they occupy a homeland which is within the borders of a state controlled 
by members of an alien ethnic group, they will defend their inalienable rights to 
retain control of their own culture, language and territory; and (4) elite theory 
that argues that elites in ethnic minority groups seek to promote their own 
careers and interest in politics by acting as ethnic entrepreneurs. These ethnic 
entrepreneurs are identified as the educated youth, the intelligentsia, or the 
professionals. Other theorists of ethnic movement try to deny the validity of 
single-causal explanation and argue that “secessionist movements would seem to 
emerge when one or a combination characterizes a particular situation” (p.119). 
Rather than taking a side single theoretical framework, this paper seeks to take 
eclectic position to combine those theories in explaining Aceh case. 
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1992). My comment on the trend is straightforward: the focus on 
the unique and complex circumstances of the Aceh case –as 
commonly promoted by most Southeast Asianists-- neglect general 
explanations and the theoretical aspects of this particular seces-
sionist movement. 
The aim of this paper is to observe important variables of 
the Acehnese rebellion in order to find a general explanation on 
this particular ethnic secessionist movement. I believe that behind 
the unique appearance of the Aceh case we can discern elements of 
a common pattern within the framework of theoretical discussion 
on ethno-nationalism. This exercise has led me to focus attention 
on the character and the impact of the state institutions of 
Indonesia as key elements in explaining the emergence and the 
development of the Aceh secessionist movements. 
 
B. State-Building, Centralization, and Regional Rebellion;          
A Historical Background 
Indonesian society is multi-ethnic in character, and yet the 
circumstances in which the modern state was formed have been 
such as to promote the identification of the state with the region 
inhabited by a majority ethnic community. Ethnic minority groups 
have been excluded from full membership in the state, both in the 
sense that the senior positions in the state machinery came to be 
virtually monopolised by the dominant ethnic majority and also, 
more importantly, in the centralizing character of state economic 
development. In the Indonesian geographical context, central 
governments in Java are associated with both domination of the 
ethnic majority and a center for economic distribution (McVey, 
1984: 21-40). 
It is this association of the state, and hence the economic 
well being, with the majority ethnic groups which provides the 
starting point for explaining the development of ethnic seces-
sionist movements among the Indonesian ethnic minorities. The 
centralizing character of the Indonesian state derives from 
circumstances of its formation. Although Indonesia is unique in 
having achieved both its independence and its colonial system 
since the sixteenth century, it shared similar pattern with most of 
the states in the post-colonial world. It was colonial conquest by 
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the Dutch which determined the character of the state. The Malay-
Indonesian archipelago comprises up to two hundred and sixteen 
distinct linguistic groups. However, the eight largest (82 percent of 
the population) are predominant in the major islands of Java, 
Sumatra, Borneo and Sulawesi, where important Islamic sultanates 
and kingdoms shared both the experience of conquest and 
colonization by the Dutch and the struggle for ethnic-regional 
freedom (McVey, 1984:19-20; Brown, 1989:157-171). Batavia --
found within modern day Jakarta-named after the Roman 
designation for Holland-- located in north western part of Java, 
was the most important city during the Dutch colonial adminis-
tration as it the home office for the governor general of the 
Netherlands East Indies. From the seventeenth century onwards, 
the main geo-political division in the Malay-Indonesian 
archipelago was the cleavage between Java under effective control 
and cultural development of the Dutch and regions of the other 
major islands. The non-Javanese regions were meanwhile still 
referred to as underdeveloped (“terbelakang”) and less educated 
(McVey, 2003:7-9; Morris, 1984: 28). 
This cleavage was consolidated during the subsequent two 
centuries of Dutch colonial education policy for the native 
population and then the early period of independence. While the 
policy was meant to “transforming the native in the archipelago 
into a modern civilization” (Benda, 1980:160), it is in the cities of 
the Java regions that the Dutch established learning institutions 
ranging from preliminary schools to medical academies for the 
native inhabitants. It was the elite Javanese families who took 
advantage of the policies and brought them into the state 
machinery and whose culture defined the national character of the 
state. The colonial origin of the Malay-Indonesian archipelago was 
to give it a predominantly developed and westernized Javanese 
character. The independence of Indonesia in 1945 and its sub-
sequent history came to be portrayed in terms of the development 
and nationalism of Java, with other regions being portrayed as less 
significant. Cities in Java, Jakarta in particular, emerged as “the 
locus of political power, cultural core, and major concentration of 
economic distribution” (McVey, 1984:40). 
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After independence, all Indonesian regions experienced 
political tensions as a result of attempts by the central government 
in Jakarta to expand influence and attempts by regions to defend 
their autonomy. However, ethnic-regional secessionist movements 
in Indonesia cannot be explained simply in terms of center-
periphery tensions since it is the character of state and the 
consequence of its assimilations patterns that have determined the 
nature of the ensuing politics. It must be noted that although the 
Indonesian state cannot be identified with any one indigenous 
linguistic group, it can be characterised in terms of the cultural 
and geographic cleavage that has become so politically evident 
between the “overwhelmingly modernized and bureaucratized 
state system in Java,” and “the most disaffected regional 
communities … in the outer islands” (McVey, 1981:37). So that 
when the state attempted to introduce the values and institutions 
associated with a modern state system it implied that the central 
government must integrate and assimilate the ethnic groups along 
the peripheral regions within the fold of the ruling cultural. This in 
turn created a situation in which the values and institutions of the 
latter was in some way inferior. The result was, as McVey notes on 
the post-independence Indonesian state, “insofar as members of 
the ethnic groups have a role in the power structure, they have 
performed that function in the context of new state, subject to 
central government approval” (McVey, 1981:37). 
Historically speaking, the expansion of state penetration 
was implemented partly by military force, but also by reinforced 
policies of administration within the framework of a unitary state 
system. This includes the use of bahasa Indonesia as a national 
language, the promotion of the modern education system, and the 
centralized nature of political institutions (Sjamsuddin, 1984:56; 
Sukma, 2003:52-55). Perhaps the two politically significant aspects 
of state policy have, however, been the policy of reorganizing the 
military between 1948 and 1953 and the introduction of provincial 
government institutions in 1950 (van Dijk, 1981:77-90). In post-
revolutionary war Indonesia, local unit guerillas involved in the 
war for independence were bypassed by the central Government 
as it recruited Dutch educated traditional-elites to become leading 
commanders in a new Indonesian military institution (Tentara 
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National Indonesia, TNI), especially in the regions where the local 
guerilla fought (Sjamsuddin, 1984:52-57). 
The same policy was applied to the civil administration 
(Sjamsuddin, 1984:60-64; Morris, 1984:27-40). As new divisions of 
the provincial governments were established, with nine provinces 
across Indonesia, the authorities relied on members of the former 
pre-war bureaucracy. In some cases, outsiders to particular regions 
were appointed to such positions in the civil offices. This policy 
gave rise to regional feelings of discontent and increased accu-
sations that the central government in Jakarta wanted to restore 
the traditional elite to power, as van Dijk noted: 
At the proclamation of Indonesian national independence 
the provincial governors in the rudimentary administration of the 
time were still mostly sons of the region…*At+ the lower levels the 
Republican Government simply took over the local officials who 
worked for the Dutch and Japanese. After formal recognition of 
independence the situation was reversed, and as a rule governors 
no longer were natives of the region of which they were head (van 
Dijk, 1981: 356). 
The periodic expansion of the Republic Government in 
Jakarta to other regions provoked numerous rebellions. From the 
early 1950s onwards, the majority of insurgent activities that arose 
in the Archipelago took place on the part of regional 
communities.2 As regards to Aceh, the central government policy 
on Provincial Institution in 1950 to incorporate this region into 
provincial part of North Sumatra, and headed by a non-Acehnese, 
was clearly a major situational change for the formation of their 
ethnic group identity. This produced correspondingly major 
                                                 
2 A number of rebellions emerged during the post-revolutionary war 
Indonesia. They were mostly a consequence of regional-central political tensions. 
We can list a few of them: The Darul Islam rebellion (1949) in West Java intended 
to establish an Islamic state. In 1950 in South Sulawesi a clash between the army 
and guerrilla leaders resulted in a similar rising under the leadership of Kahar 
Muzakkar. At the same time the Acehnese rebellion broke out in 1953 under 
leadership of Daud Beureuh joining the Darul Islam movement in West Java. 
Other rebellions took place in North Sulawesi in 1958, South Molucas Islands in 
1956, and West Sumatera in 1960. See, Boland, The Struggle of slam in Modern 
Indonesia, The Hague: Martinus Nitjhof 1985).  
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changes in their ethnic-regional challenges of the central govern-
ment. However, what is worth mentioning here is that the Darul 
Islam rebellion of Aceh during the 1950s had a definitive repu-
blican nationalist character (Sjamsuddin, 1984:23-51; Morris, 
1984:7-18; Kell, 1995:3-11). In 1959, the rebellion ended, in return 
Jakarta recognized Aceh as a special administrative region (daerah 
istimewa) with autonomy in religious affairs, law and Islamic 
education. A native Acehnese, Ali Hasymi, was named as its first 
governor. From then on, most Acehnese were reduced to trying to 
negotiate favourable conditions through political parties as-
sociated with anti-government and/or Islamic ideologies, and 
resolved to establish an Islamic society in Aceh (Kell, 1995; 
Syamsuddin, 1984: 17-18). 
However, by the mid-1980s a new form of rebellion in 
Aceh arose declaring a Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka, GAM). Unlike the Darul Islam in the 1950s, the GAM’s 
concerns were predominantly secular in nature.  The movement’s 
propaganda “made a clearly ethnic appeal to rise up against 
Javanese colonialism,” (Kell, 1995:14) and paid great attention to 
“Aceh’s natural wealth and past glories” (Kell, 1995:61). Not only 
did The Declaration of Independence of Aceh-Sumatera make no 
mention of religious issues, the key actors within the GAM were 
dominated by secular-elite intelligentsias who emerged during the 
process of economic development (Kell, 1995: 67-8). By highlight-
ting the economic resources of the region, and by giving voice to a 
sense of resentment against the Javanese-dominated state, the 
elites within GAM promoted Acehnese distrust of solutions within 
institutional boundaries of the Indonesian state. Thus according to 
GAM independence from Indonesia is the final solution for the 
failure of institutional building of Indonesia within the framework 
of center-periphery relation. 
 
C. Traditional Authority, Islamic Mobilization, and Rebellion: 
The Darul Islam 
The process of incorporation into, and penetration by, the 
modern state was clearly a major situational change for the Aceh 
community in post-war Indonesia. Consequently, it produced a 
shift in the Acehnese ethnic-regional identity. How then did this 
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shift in identity promote the secessionist rebellion during the 1950s 
under the banner of Islam? My preliminary observation of the 
roots of the Aceh Darul Islam rebellion reveals that such a 
formation of an ethnic-regional identity on a popular level was 
accompanied by the dramatic decline in the power, authority and 
status of the indigenous elites as a result of state penetration. Both 
changes contributed to the development of the appeals to 
primordial sentiments which were useful for political mobilization 
during the rebellion. 
The crisis of traditional elites in Aceh can be traced in the 
periodic decline of the Sultanate of Aceh and the expansion of 
Dutch colonial conquest in North Sumatra between the 18th and 
early 19th centuries. During Dutch colonial times, there was rivalry 
“to gain control over the politics and economy of Aceh between 
ulama (Muslim scholars and clerics) and nobility (the uleebalang) 
within the sultanate of Aceh” (Morris, 1984:37-40; Kell, 1995:17-
18).3 Concerned primarily with the defence of the Acehnese 
sultanate territories, the uleebalang could not provide the unity 
necessary for resistance against the Dutch. Most compromised 
with the colonial government and as administrators in the colonial 
government, the nobility became politically dependent on Dutch 
authority and alienated from the wider population. By the early 
18th century, the “sultanate of Aceh became a weak institution, 
largely without influence in the internal affairs of territory” (Kell, 
1995:19), the struggle for resistance came to be led by the ulama 
who had always been revered in Aceh but had been largely 
uninvolved in the running of society. During the 1880s, as 
Anthony Reid notes, “the war was gradually transformed into 
genuinely popular cause under ulama inspiration.” (Reid, 1979:60) 
The foremost theorist and tactician of the holy war was Teungku 
Chik di Tiro of Pidie (Reid, 1979:58). However, by 1903 a stable 
uleebalang administration under Dutch control was in place and, in 
                                                 
3 Nobility and ulama classes represent social elites in most Indonesian 
Muslim communities referring to political and religious elites. In Aceh, Sultan 
Iskandar Muda brought this nobility into being during the golden era of the Aceh 
sultanate in the 16th century. See, Hadi,  Islam and Politics in Aceh in Seventeenth 
Century, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2003), p. 14-56.    
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1913, the Dutch could at last be said to have conquered Aceh, the 
ulama having finally given up the guerrilla struggle (Morris, 1984: 
71-73). 
In the late 1920s a reformist religious revival was initiated 
by the ulama, inspired by “the new forces transforming both the 
Islamic and Indonesian worlds” (Noer, 1984: 42-46). The reformist 
movement swept the rural areas of Aceh, providing the Acehnese 
with a hope for a better future for their society. Reid (1979) 
observed that social and economic conditions in the 
early twentieth century Aceh were conducive to the success of 
the revival: the collapse of pepper production in the mid-1910s led 
to high unemployment in the 1930s, and consequently were drawn 
to the teachings of the reformist ulama. The reformist enthusiasm 
culminated in the formation in 1939 of the All Aceh Ulama 
Association (Pusat Ulama Seluruh Aceh, PUSA). This organization 
was “the nearest approach to a popular movement of an all-Aceh 
character” (Reid, 1979:64). The PUSA Acehnese demographics 
rendered it acceptable to the Dutch, for whom the activities of 
Indonesian nationalists were a greater cause of concerns. But as 
the divisions between the nobility, ulama and their subjects 
became bitter in the fading years of Dutch rule in Aceh, “all of the 
anti-establishment forces gradually associated themselves with 
Ulama Association (PUSA), transforming them in the process into 
more political organization” (Morris, 1984: 77).  
A short period of Japanese occupation in the former Dutch 
East Indies was welcomed by the ulama (Sjamsuddin, 1985:31-33). 
With the collapse of the Japanese war effort in 1945, Aceh joined 
the struggle for Indonesian independence. In October 1945, the 
ulama indicated their support for the new republic with the 
“Declaration of Ulama Throughout Aceh,” signed by four 
prominent religious leaders, including Daud Beureuh, and 
declaring the struggle a holy war (Sjamsuddin, 1985:39; Morris, 
1984:99-111). This support did not, however, extend to the “new 
official Republican leadership” in Aceh, which “was virtually to a 
man the uleebalang establishment,” (Morris, 1984:107) and many of 
whose members looked forward to the restoration of Dutch power 
and of the prewar status quo. In these circumstances, as Reid 
noted, “the revolutionary impulse came from a coalition of PUSA 
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ulama and young educated in the Islamic learning institutions” 
(Reid, 1979:90). 
The Ulama resistance movements soon became social 
revolutions as these groups confronted the uleebalang (Kahin, 
1970). By March 1946, the nobility had been decimated, and 
political, economic, and military power in Aceh fell into the hands 
of the PUSA ulama and forces associated with it.  From then on, 
the only institution that defined the character of anti-Dutch 
nationalist movements was the ulama. During the 
central government’s preoccupation with the struggle against the 
re-imposition of Dutch authority in Java, from the late-1940s to the 
mid-1950s, this new emerging elite in Aceh operated with almost 
complete autonomy (Kell, 1995:45-46). Its members consolidated 
their positions within the Acehnese social structure and controlled 
all political and economic activities, including “a lucrative barter 
trade across the Straits of Malacca with Penang and Singapore” 
(Kell, 1994:46). But Aceh’s choice to integrate itself into the 
struggle for the Indonesian independence was mainly inspired by 
the desire to run its regional affairs without interference from 
Jakarta. The Acehnese elites also expected that their region’s 
contribution to the national revolution would be acknowledged in 
the new Indonesian state. But the new-formed government in 
Jakarta soon demonstrated that it had no intention of securing 
both the creation of an autonomous Acehnese region 
and preserving the role of existing traditional elites in governing 
their territory. With the central government policy of provincial 
division in 1949, in which Aceh was incorporated into the Province 
of North Sumatra, the Acehnese community came to see the their 
support of the new Republic betrayed (Sjamsuddin, 1984:57-63; 
Kell, 1995:18-19). 
This process was furthered by the disruption of traditional 
authority structures. As Jakarta attempted to establish leadership 
of the modern state machinery in Aceh, it removed the ulama from 
positions of political and administrative power and replaced them 
with new elites based on modern-Westernized measures as 
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administrators over the region4 (van Dijk, 1981: 236). The 
cumulative effect of these pressures on Aceh was, as noted by 
Morris, “a situation where completing elites, ulama and young 
educated in Islamic schools, were seeking ways to regain support 
and legitimacy in their community. Thus they were in a position to 
take advantage of the incipient ethnic-regional consciousness by 
articulating and ideologising it” (Morris, 1984:57) 
This situation gave rise to “anti-Jakarta” sentiments, 
particularly in the period of centralization of state institutions and 
military organizations. With the undermining of the uleebalang 
influence, it was the ulama that were able to maintain the claims of 
leadership in Aceh territory. The emergence of the Darul Islam 
revolt in West Java in 1949, followed by other regions in South 
Kalimatan (1951) and South Sulawesi (1952), facilitated the 
popular discontent amongst the Acehnese arising from the 
Indonesian government’s disruptive policies in the region. 
Subsequently various political movements and militias were 
formed, and although few groups demanded a separate state of 
Aceh, the dominant trend was to declare the Acehnese rebellion as 
a part of the Darul Islam in West Java, Indonesia. Within this 
framework, the Aceh Darul Islam movement against the 
Indonesian republic did not seek to secede but, instead, to 
transform it. 
Like the Darul Islam movements in other regions, the role 
of the ulama in the Acehnese rebellion was salient. The population 
was mobilized by religious leaders around Islamic symbols; not 
exclusively ethnic, but at the same time tied with Indonesian 
nationalism (Morris, 1984:111-117; Sjamsuddin, 1984). While the 
idea of an Islamic state might have been unclear, in Aceh, the 
mobilization for rebellion developed out of attempts by elites to 
respond to institutional changes that threatened the traditional 
structure and authority: namely the Muslim communities in 
                                                 
4 Karl Jackson (1980), in his study on the Darul Islam of West Java, 
suggested that the decline of traditional authority has become a source of social 
discontent that inspired Muslim elite in West Java to join the rebellion. See, Karl 
Jackson, Islam, Traditional Authority and the Darul Islam Rebellion, Berkley: Stanford 
University Press, 1980). 
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Indonesia. It appears that by expressing the idea of an Islamic state 
in the context of an ethnic-regional identity (i.e., the assertion that 
the cultural integrity of Indonesian Muslim community makes 
self-government not just a desirable goal but an inalienable right), 
the ulama of Aceh ensured the escalation of political tension with 
the Jakarta administration into a direct confrontation between 
secular-state nationalism and Islamic nationalism.  
Two important political developments in post-indepen-
dence Indonesia contributed to the Islamic mobilization in Aceh. 
Firstly, as the ulama power and authority base grew stronger 
during the Indonesian revolution, the ulama leadership began to 
dominate the administrative structure of Aceh-Indonesia. As a 
result, Islamic symbols and identity became a source of unification 
of the Acehnese in their relationship with central government. 
Secondly, the failure of political elites in Jakarta to adopt an 
Islamic constitution in Indonesia in 1945 had been particularly 
important in signifying the formulation of vision of an Islamic 
state for the Darul Islam rebellions (van Dijk, 1981; Boland, 
1984:20). This, linked to the formation of provincial institutions in 
which Aceh was incorporated into non-Acehnese-led North 
Sumatera government in 1948, determined the success of the 
ulama to integrate the political interest of Acehnese territory into 
its religious markers. 
The Acehnese population supported the rebellion that 
began in 1953. The Ulama, high ranking civil servants and ex-
military commanders constituted the core members of the 
rebellion but tens of thousands of villagers joined (van Dick, 
1981:219). Even if the supply of arms limited their ability to fully 
participate, they supported the rebellion by monitoring Indonesian 
troop movements or providing material support (Sjamsuddin, 
1985:81-86). As Sjamsuddin noted, the ulama could mobilize the 
population in large part because of the respect they enjoyed 
among the Acehnese and because of their Islamic goals 
(Sjamsuddin, 1985:83). 
The settlement of the rebellion narrowed the field of 
possibilities for the future resistance in Aceh. Three aspects were 
important in the resolution of hostilities. First, the declining 
struggle for an Islamic state in other regions with the capture of its 
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central leader, Kartosowirjo-West Java, in 1960, and the 
assassination of Kahar Muzakar-South Sulawesi, in 1961, created a 
situation in which the Acehnese leaders began to question the 
moral objective for the establishment of an Islamic state (Boland, 
1984:63; van Dijk, 1981:214).   
Second, the compromise with the Republic allowed the 
Acehnese elite to redefine its objectives in regional terms. 
Meanwhile, the elites abandoned their broader struggle. In order 
to weaken the Acehnese aspirations, in late 1958 the Indonesian 
government reinstated Aceh’s provincial status, returned many 
PUSA members to their previous positions, and reassigned 
Acehnese soldiers to serve in the region. When a cease-fire was 
reached in early 1959, rebel leaders were split into groups between 
those who rejected the Jakarta compensation and those who 
compromised and accepted a settlement on Aceh. However, most 
rebels abandoned Daud Beureueh’s group, the radical faction, and 
joined Hasan Saleh’s which negotiated the compromise with the 
government. At the end, the government agreed to extending 
wide-ranging autonomy in religion, education, and customary 
law, under a new status as a “special region” (Sjamsuddin, 1985: 
81-84).5 
Third, such an agreement with Jakarta further divided the 
Acehnese political elite. Most civil servant and administrators of 
the region, who later joined the Darul Islam rebellion, accepted the 
settlement with the Republic. They were not ulama, but had 
strongly supported the PUSA leadership during the revolution. 
Agreements that were perceived as a return to the special status of 
Aceh meant a return of power and cultural autonomy for them. 
This segment of the political elites served as the primary actors 
who persuaded the Acehnese community to settle for an Islamic 
Aceh, far short of the broader goal of an Islamic state for 
Indonesia. The peace was reached between Darul Islam of Aceh 
and Jakarta in 1962 that brought Aceh into the Indonesian nation. 
 
  
                                                 
5 Within the Indonesian provincial government system, there are only 
two provinces with special status: Aceh and Yogyakarta.  
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D. The New Order and the Rise of Free Aceh Movement 
 By the end of the 1980s another Acehnese rebellion against 
the central government arose: the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka, GAM). This second rebellion emerged with 
different leaders, agenda, and forms of mobilization. Nevertheless, 
its rise can be explained as an unintended consequence of the three 
pillars of the New Order’s institutional development: political 
homogenization, military force to eliminate political opposition, 
and economic growth (Sulistyanto, 2001:213-230). Although a 
peace settlement was reached between Aceh leaders and the 
central government in 1962, the authoritarian rule of the New 
Order tightened the institutional constraints on Aceh and 
promoted greater integration into the Indonesian nation. This 
political development created its own untenable tensions and, in 
the case of Aceh-center relations, led to escalating violence. My 
argument is straight forward: the defeat of the Acehnese in the 
Darul Islam uprising, the strong sense of communal identity, and 
their special status, created they political and social environment 
in which negative reaction to the economic exploitation of their 
region and the use of military force to solve center-regional 
problems found fertile soil. 
 Historically speaking, less then a decade after Aceh had 
been granted “special region” status, in 1965 a major political 
change took place in Jakarta: the fall of Sukarno and the emer-
gence of the New Order government under Suharto. Aceh was one 
of the areas where this new government received warmly, 
primarily because of its strong anti-Communist stance (Boland, 
1982:29). However, the Acehnese soon found that their early 
optimism had been misplaced. The authoritarian character in the 
ending years of Sukarno’s rule continued to appeal for the 
institutional development of the New Order. Not only did the 
regime have no intention of giving wider scope to Islam as a social 
and political force, Aceh’s special status faded rapidly with the 
centralization of political, economic and military power. The 
regime legitimized its centralizing character by promoting homo-
genization, military force to suppress any opposition –especially 
those who were separatist in nature—and economic development. 
In the political sphere, mobilization in favor of an Islamic state was 
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no longer tolerated. Furthermore, Suharto and the military 
consolidated their power relative to the legislature, political 
parties and business groups, which became very restricted. As 
Robison (1987:154) noted, “patrimonial networks were the only 
means left of accessing resources and power in Suharto’s New 
Order.” 
 In 1968, the Acehnese provincial assembly implemented 
elements of Islamic law through the regional regulation No. 6 
(Schwarz, 2001:316-318). Despite its limited application, for 
instance to minor issues such as holiday in public offices and 
schools on Friday to give Muslims time to go for Friday prayers, 
the regulation was never approved by Jakarta. In the realm of 
education, the ulama proposed modifications that would have 
reconciled the traditional Islamic schools and the public elemen-
tary schools, so that the Acehnese would be exposed to both. This 
proposal never received an answer from the Ministry of National 
Education, and was therefore never implemented. Within these 
constraints, the ulama could no longer promote Islam in the 
political realm in Aceh and were restricted even in the Islamic 
education system. 
In 1973, the New Order took steps toward curtailing all 
political parties, especially those associated with the struggle for 
an Islamic state (Liddle, 1985:97-119). Through manipulation, co-
optation, and repression, the New Order virtually rendered 
impotent the Islamic organizations. It maintained the ban on 
Masyumi, the largest  Islamic party in the 1950s, and prevented its 
former leaders from leading a government-created version of the 
party under the Development Unity Party (PPP). Its creation 
further weakened Islamic politics by forcing all Muslim social 
organizations with different ideological backgrounds under the 
same umbrella. As the vehicles to promote Islamic values were 
constrained, some ulama in Aceh sought to utilize the new 
channels for access to the regime and its patronage network. They 
joined the government party, Golongan Karya (Golkar), and the 
regime-sponsored Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia, MUI).  
 As the role of the ulama declined, the central government 
fostered the development of the technocratic elite of Aceh (Kell, 
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1995:87). Having received a modern education in Jakarta and 
abroad, yet strongly committed to Islamic values, this elite was 
sympathetic to the government’s modernization programs. It 
gained ascendancy in administrative positions, the military, the 
provincial government, and the university, especially the local 
Syiah Kuala Unversity (Amal, 1997: 218-219). The technocratic 
vision began to supersede the Islamic vision of the ulama. And 
through this power relation among the elites, the central govern-
ment was able to extend its influence and create a constituency 
with a strong interest in preserving the New Order institutional 
order. It is such a division in the elites of the Acehnese community 
that explains the relatively weaker support for Acehnese secession 
movement that emerged in the mid- 1970s and revived in the end 
of 1980s. 
 Economic development was the primary pillar of the New 
Order regime’s legitimacy. In Aceh, this particular aspect of 
modernization was closely linked to the development of central-
regional industrial enclaves. In 1971, large reserves of liquid 
natural gas (LNG) were discovered in North Aceh. By 1977, an 
industrial zone had been created near Lhoksumawe where most of 
the LNG reserves were located. By the 1980s, Aceh was supplying 
30% of the country’s oil and gas exports, which were the 
government’s main source of revenue. Other energy-dependent 
industries were also established, such as the Aceh fertilizer plant 
and cement factories (Schwarz, 2001:311). 
However, problems remained of economic resource 
exploitation in Aceh that were directed by Jakarta following a 
centralized pattern of fiscal management policy. The logic of the 
system followed that of a unitary state institution with national 
development goals that superseded any regional or provincial 
considerations. As a result, almost all of the revenues from these 
investments moved directly to foreign investors, their Indonesian 
partners in Jakarta, and the central government. The provincial 
government, in turn, received its annual budget through a system 
of allocation at the central government level and retained few 
rights to taxation. Therefore, the provincial budget amounted to 
only a very small fraction of the total revenues generated in the 
province. Such a centralized financial institution created a 
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situation in which the Aceh population received only a few 
benefits derived from this economic web.6 A large proportion of 
Acehnese consequently saw little progress in their living 
standards, while LNG production and other industrial ventures 
developed. 
Another pillar that constituted the New Order institutional 
approach to Aceh was the expansion of the military. Under the 
New Order regime, the military had come to play a central role. In 
line with the notion of unitary state system, the armed forces saw 
themselves as the ultimate guardians of national unity. The strong 
military presence in Aceh since the early 1970s, as Crouch 
(1989:46) noted, “is a consequence of institutional arrangements of 
the New Order’s policy on national unity and political stability.” 
Islamic politics was co-opted as they were seen as a threat to the 
state, and Aceh had been a main region where the issue of the 
Islamic state had been strong. While a negotiated solution, 
mediated by Acehnese military officers and politicians, allowed 
Islamic rebels to reintegrate into Acehnese society peacefully, the 
armed forces were not as tolerant of separatist rebels in the 1970s 
and in the late 1980s (Kell, 1985:57). Moreover, disgruntled elites 
resented the central government’s control over LNG and other 
industrial production. As a result, it was common for the armed 
forces to use military repression as a primary tool to maintain 
national unity and political stability. 
Hasan Tiro founded the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka, GAM) in October 1976, he was at the time a local 
businessman and had previously been a representative of the 
Darul Islam at the United Nations. Its first emergence was 
marginal and had garnered little support. The GAM denounced 
the “Javanese” colonial empire and especially the exploitation of 
Aceh’s natural resources and the use of military force to maintain 
                                                 
6 In the midst of national economic growth between 1987-1995, Aceh 
population was still left in agricultural production. Up until the 1980s, more than 
68 percent of Acehnese remained employed in the agricultural sector and there 
were virtually no significant development in the industrial zone. Many of the 
skilled workers originated from out-side Aceh and lived in gated compounds. 
See, Hall, Indonesian Economy under the New Order, (Brisbane: Monash University 
Press, 1996), pp. 68-70.    
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control. With only a few hundred supporters, the movement 
declared the independence of Aceh-Sumatra in 1977, and raised 
the GAM flag in various locations, but undertook no significant 
military actions. This secessionist movement was formed mainly 
of intellectuals, technocrats and businessmen. Morris (1989) and 
Kell (1995) agree in their respective analysis of the movement that 
it failed to capture wide support, in part because it barely 
mentioned Islam. Certainly, the absence of an Islamic agenda kept 
the ulama from supporting the movement and a few even denoun-
ced it. Brown (1990:116-127) argues that among the broader 
population, it was too early in the development of the province’s 
large economic resources for strong resentment at the few socio-
economic benefits of industrial production to have arisen. The 
ethnic appeals to an Acehnese independent state did not seem to 
capture a wide audience. And the 1970s GAM was eclipsed by a 
political trend among the Acehnese ulama and technocratic elite to 
integrate the territory into Indonesian nation through maintaining 
their links with central institutions, such as bureaucracy, political 
parties (Golkar and the PPP) and Islamic social organizations such 
as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. 
The GAM secessionist movement re-emerged in the late 
1980s. In this moment, the movement seemed to enjoy much 
broader support among the local population and, although 
remained relatively small number in fighters, was better armed 
(Kell, 1985:43-48). Yet, as in the 1970s, the Acehnese were not 
necessarily supportive of the idea of an independent Aceh but they 
saw an opportunity to share in common grievances against the 
Indonesian government. A couple of significant factors contri-
buting to the stronger influence of the GAM were the continuing 
presence of the armed forces to protect industrial plants and the 
increasing gap created between the wealth surrounding LNG 
production relative to property of the population in Aceh. 
What is worth noting from this second emergence is the 
fact that, while the GAM hold ethnic-communal mobilization, the 
Acehnese had begun to shift the nature of their grievances. From 
the Darul Islam rebellion, they retained their sense of identity, 
which was distinct from that the rest of Indonesian nation. Kell 
(1995:94) notes that: 
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[The] Acehnese had fought for an Islamic Indonesia, had 
lost, and had retreated in a regionalist defense of Islam and 
local culture. As they become more marginalized, the 
autonomy for Islam was never implemented and only a 
small portion of the elite seemed to reap benefits from the 
New Order regime. 
It is against this background that, for the Aceh population the 
exploitation of natural resource, other industrial production, and 
increased military presence showed that the Acehnese had little 
means to gain benefits from the development in their territory. 
  New Order’s response to the rebellion was out of 
proportion to the estimate of GAM forces. Since 1989, parts of 
Aceh, especially its northern and western regions, were designated 
as a Military Operation region (Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM). In 
July 1990, 6,000 troops were sent to supplement the 6,000 already 
in the province, while GAM forces were numbered at only a few 
hundred (Sulistyanto, 2001:37; Sukma, 2003:24). By 1993, the 
rebellion was crushed but the armed forces continued their 
operation. Since the estimated that thousands of villagers 
supported the GAM, soldiers used torture, arbitrary killings, 
arrests, detentions, and other means of weeding out supporters. 
According to an Indonesian human rights group, Forum Peduli 
HAM (Forum for Human Rights Concern), which was founded 
after the end of the New Order in 1998, 2,000 people were killed 
during the decade of DOM implementation in Aceh. Hundreds 
also disappeared and more than 2,300 people were tortured 
(Sulistyanto, 2001: 40-42). 
The continuing use of violence to suppress GAM activities, 
even after the sudden collapse of New Order, has brought 
cumulative grievances among the Acehnese as they share common 
suffering and alienation within the Indonesian state. The GAM 
secessionist movement then retained tremendous symbolic force 
as an organization through which all Acehnese grievances could 
be channeled. As a consequence, when democratization of the 
Indonesian regimes in post-Suharto New Order allowed 
cumulative grievances to express themselves, civilian movement 
began to demand a referendum on the status of Aceh (Sukma, 
2003: 28-35). Although Jakarta has never admitted the demand for 
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the referendum, it is evident that a large proportion of the 
population supported independence. 
As this paper seeks to argue, the development a small 
armed-secessionist struggle to widely-supported civilian move-
ment is very much shaped by the New Order institutional legacy. 
With the use of widespread violence, the New Order regime 
shifted the Acehnese identity further away from an Indonesian 
national identity. As Brown (1999) notes on the armed separatist 
movements in Southeast Asia, “the terms of inclusion in the nation 
became defined as the silent acceptance of exploitation of natural 
resources for national interests, with few local benefits and violent 
military repression of suspected opposition.” Within such a 
situation, many Acehnese abandoned their loyalty to  
the Indonesian nation. The objectives of creating an Islamic state 
had long given way to disillusion and, now, disgust with the 
treatment of the Acehnese at the hands of Jakarta’s armed forces. 
Many people in Aceh had suffered from the military operation 
and, therefore, many more Acehnese shifted their support to the 
secession. From marginal movement, GAM ethnic appeals came to 
symbolize resistance not only to the New Order but also to the 
Indonesian state and nation.   
 
D. Ethnicity, Institution and the Choice to Secede: Concluding 
Remarks 
 As the purpose of this paper is to explain the continuity 
and change in Acehnese rebellion, our examination of the two 
periods of ethno-secessionist movement has offered several 
answers that illustrate a direction opposite to that which most 
studies on Acehnese rebellion have claimed. It is the interaction 
between institutional changes and opportunities that explain why 
such a politics of ethnic identity arose, and in what way ethnic 
identity was mobilized and politicized in the two period of 
rebellion. Primordial approaches to the phenomenon, as area 
specialists have pointed out, tend to interpret the meaning of the 
emergence of identity political movements by focusing on their 
cultural dimension. Consequently, as Acehnese case demonstrates, 
there are no significant differences between historical cultural / 
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social profiles among the ethnic movements in the two periods of 
mobilization. 
My analysis to the two phases of rebellion reveals that the 
strength of Islam for mobilization in the first Acehnese rebellion 
and its virtual absence of such a mobilization amongst the GAM 
leaders, defies the framework of the primordial approaches. To the 
primordialists, ethno-nationalist mobilizations have been 
associated with common social and political profiles, most 
importantly with specific agendas to establish a state with its 
ethnic boundaries and a belief in a common cultural identity 
driving the ethnic-state’s politics (Smith, 1987). At that point, the 
cultural approach fails to explain the different political consequen-
ces of particular ethno-nationalist groups. 
Historical institutionalism provides a more illuminating 
explanation in regards to the contrast between two different 
phases of rebellion in the Aceh case. The proponents of institu-
tionalism believe that institutions are relatively autonomous of 
social actors and are important actors in political life. P.A. Hall has 
argued that institutions are “influencing an actor’s definition of his 
own interest, by establishing his institutional responsibilities and 
relationship to other actors’ as well as structuring power relations 
among actors and therefore policy outcomes” (Hall, 196:937). 
Similarly, Steinmo et al. (1992) argued that institutions shape the 
goals of political actors. 
As the case of Acehnese rebellion, two aspects of 
Indonesian institutional history explain the variations between the 
Islamic character of rebellion in the 1950s and the ethnic appeals in 
the late 1980s. The first involves attempts at state policies and 
penetration of regional territories, especially in the post-
revolutionary Indonesia, to weaken the traditional structure of 
ethnic-regional communities. The elites’ attempts of maintaining 
their legitimacy coincide with the search at the popular level for a 
response to the state’s institutional penetration. In regards to Aceh, 
this in turn engendered feelings of insecurity out of which a new 
basis for communal identity was beginning to develop. The 
Acehnese joined the Indonesian Republic from a point where they 
had formed a unique sense of community through their past glory 
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as a regional power, their resistance to the Dutch, and their strong 
ties with the ulama. 
The Darul Islam rebellion contested the Indonesian state’s 
decision to discard the Islamic option in favour of a nationalist-
secularist concept. The subsequent autonomy and special status of 
Aceh were sufficient for Jakarta to bring back the elite to their 
socio-political position.  This political development, however, 
stabilized the Aceh-Jakarta relations until the next institutional 
juncture when, under the Suharto New Order regime, a more 
centralist, repressive, and exploitative form of the state institution 
was implemented.  
Under the New Order, the Aceh-Jakarta relations under-
went an unintended transformation accompanying the second 
aspect of the state’s institutional development favouring an 
authoritarian path to establish order and stability: control through 
military actions. Suharto’s repression of Aceh regional demands, 
especially severe and brutal suppression of any secessionist 
aspirations during the 1970’s and 1980’s, and subsequent political 
accommodation among the newly emerging Acehnese elites 
through state bureaucracy and co-opted Islamic party, PPP, led the 
Acehnese to conflate the ideas of an ethnic-based rebellion against 
the central government. Consequently, the use of force during 
Suharto’s authoritarian institution unintentionally narrowed the 
ability to convince the Acehnese population of the benefits of New 
Order’s institutional building. Such violence had created the 
political opportunities for marginalized ethnic-elites within the 
GAM to mobilize the population by perceiving the Indonesian 
nation as exploitative and destructive for the Acehnese. All of this 
was largely responsible for broadening and deepening the GAM 
secession struggle, especially during the particularly repressive 
decade of the 1990s.  
In summary, the insights provided by historical institu-
tionalism as an approach to ethno-nationalist movement lies in its 
ability to explain variations and irregularities in its mobili-zation 
outcomes. This makes it a particularly challenging approach to 
primordialist account, because one of the noticeable features of 
cultural identities is their contingency. They appear only within 
some groups whose political claims only appear in certain 
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occasions. The nature and intensity of these claims fluctuate, and 
vary from one movement group to another. The contextual 
character of ethnic identities and their political consequences 
suggest that ethno-regional identity does not emerge sponta-
neously from distinct ethnic markers, since it serves only as a point 
of departure. Rather, it is shaped by institutional design. Institu-
tions, therefore, are a central point for an analysis to illuminate the 
processes of identity creation, transformation, and mobilization 
that lie at the heart of politics of ethno-nationalism. 
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